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THE EFFECTS OF MODALITY AND STIMULUS TYPE ON MEMORY FOR FREQUENCY 
The Effects of Modality and 
Stimilus Type on Memory for 
Frequency 
Kelly Pritchard 
Ithaca College 
ABSTRACT 
The effect of presentation modality 
and stimulus type on memory for frequency 
was examined. In Experiment 1, forty 
undergraduate students viewed or handled 
21 three-dimensional items. Items were 
either (a) geometric shapes, (b) nonsense 
objects, or (c) familiar items and occurred 
either 2, 4, or 6 times, creating a randomly 
ordered list of 72 items. Subjects were 
tested in the same modality on their memory 
for frequency of those items. Subjects were 
able to distinguish between items which 
occurred less frequently versus those which 
occurred more often. The average 
frequency estimates for nonsense and 
familiar items were closest to the actual 
average. In Experiment 2, subjects initially 
viewed or handled the items and were tested 
in the opposite modality. Subjects were 
again sensitive to frequency although the 
pattern of frequency estimates for geometric 
items differed significantly. It appears 
subjects may have been deprived of too 
many haptic cues to distinctly identify each 
geometric shape. Results support a central 
frequency processing mechanism 
hypothesis. 
INTRODUCTION 
People have the ability to retain an 
accurate count of the frequency of 
occurrence of events around them (Hasher 
& Zacks, 1984). This ability has been well 
documented in instances involving the 
visual system, such as memory for 
frequency of words (Beins, Lindner, & 
Lepsch, 1991 ) and for single letter 
occurrences (Attneave, 1953, cited in 
Hasher & Zacks, 1984). However, 
evidence suggesting its existence in other 
modalities, in particular the tactile modality, 
is lacking. 
Hasher and Zacks (1984) described 
the process as automatic; one only need 
experience an event and it will be registered 
in memory as having occurred. As such, 
whether one intended to process such 
information would play no role in the 
processing of the event. Jonides and 
Naveh-Benjamin (1987), however, propose 
a multi-mechanism model of frequency 
encoding that consists of a direct and an 
indirect coding mechanism. The direct 
coding mechanism codes events using an 
active process, such as counting, which 
registers the frequency of that event as a 
separate attribute of the event. The indirect 
coding mechanism encodes the frequency 
information of that particular event. Jonides 
and Naveh-Benjamin (1987) suggest these 
two mechanisms together contribute to the 
frequency storage process. 
In our first study, subjects will be 
presented either visually or tactually with 
nonsense objects (i.e., items which, when 
presented both visually and tactually, are 
difficult to identify); three-dimensional 
geometric figures; and familiar items, 
chosen from a list composed by Klatzky, 
Lederman, & Metzger (1985). Subjects will 
then be tested for their memory for 
frequency of these items in the same 
modality. 
Klatzky et al. (1985) asserted that 
the haptic system is inadequate in object 
identification, especially when compared 
with the visual system. Research comparing 
the visual system to the haptic system using 
two-dimensional nonsense shapes (e.g., 
Bryant & Raz, 1975; Cashdan, 1968; Rock 
& Victor, 1964, cited in Klatzky et al., 
1985) and research conducted using 
tangible graphics displays, such as maps or 
graphs (e.g., Lederman & Campbell, 1982; 
Klatzky & Barber, 1985; Magee & 
Kennedy, 1980, cited in Klatzky et al., 
1985) have provided empirical evidence for 
this conclusion. However, it may be the 
absence of important cues in these stimuli 
which lead to the resulting differences 
between the modalities and the ultimate 
assessment of the haptic system as being 
inadequate. 
To assess the possibility that 
reduced cues make the haptic system seem 
impoverished, Klatzky et al. (1985) 
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blindfolded subjects and allowed them to 
feel familiar objects. Subjects were 
instructed to name the objects as quickly as 
possible and were asked to tell how they 
arrived at their conclusions. Results 
indicated subjects were able to identify a 
wide range of objects quickly and 
accurately. In addition, subjects reported 
using global shape (e.g., of a comb), global 
texture, the presence of a distinct 
component (e.g., a pen cap or a tea bag 
string), component texture, global size, and 
component shape most often when making 
identification decisions using only haptic 
information. 
Of particular interest in our study is 
the effect of the modality on memory for 
frequency. Kazen-Saad (1986) presented 
one group of subjects with patterns made of 
wire, allowing them to touch each while 
blindfolded. The second group constructed 
the patterns in their mind while listening to 
verbal descriptions of the patterns. After 
each pattern was completed, subjects in 
each group were told to indicate orally the 
target pattern from a recognition sheet 
containing the target amidst distracters. 
Kazen-Saad concluded that information 
taken in by the two different sensory 
pathways was in turn processed differently, 
allowing for better performance in the 
verbal (aural) condition. Will such a 
difference between modalities be 
demonstrated when testing memory for 
frequency or is this information processed 
in the same way, regardless of modality? 
Of further interest in our study is the 
effect, if any, of the stimulus type on 
memory for frequency. Perhaps the 
familiarity of the items plays a role in 
frequency recall ability. Bower, Karlin, and 
Dueck (1975), for instance, presented 
subjects with a series of nonsense pictures. 
One group was given an interpretation of 
the drawings during the presentation while 
another was not. All subjects were asked to 
recreate the gist of the drawings they could 
remember immediately following all 
presentations. Subjects in the interpretation 
group recalled significantly more pictures 
than those subjects receiving no 
interpretation. Bower et al. suggest that if a 
picture may be related to a schema and thus 
understood, it will be remembered much  
better than pictures for which no 
understanding is generated. Perhaps the 
interpretation effect will be observed as 
subjects try to estimate frequency of 
occurrence of nonsense objects, which are 
characterized by their ambiguity and lack of 
identification. If subjects have difficulty 
interpreting the nonsense items because of 
lack of familiarity or cue deprivation, 
subjects' performance would be worst for 
the nonsense objects. Furthermore, if the 
ability to tally items is modality dependent, 
one would expect that subjects' 
performance might change across 
modalities. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Forty undergraduate students 
participated in the study, some of whom 
received extra credit. None of the 
participants were paid. All were treated in 
accordance with the "Ethical Principles of 
Psychologists" (American Psychological 
Association, 1981). 
Materials 
The stimuli consisted of familiar 
objects taken from a list published by 
Klatzky et al. (1985), geometric objects, 
and nonsense stimuli. The geometric 
objects were hollow plastic shapes, 
including those found in the infant's toy 
L'il Hands Shape Sorter Bucket,. by 
Unimax Toys. The nonsense objects were 
gathered and chosen based on whether or 
not the experimenters could recognize them 
as familiar or determine their purpose. 
Those that failed to spark recognition or an 
idea of purpose were deemed suitable for 
use in our study. 
All of the stimuli were kept in a 
box, out of view of the subjects. For those 
subjects in the tactile condition, a blindfold 
was also used. 
Procedure 
Subjects were told they would be 
presented with a series of objects either 
visually or tactually and would later be 
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tested for their memory for these items. The 
specific nature of the memory test was left 
unspecified. 
In the tactile acquisition condition, 
subjects were blindfolded and presented 
with each stimulus individually. They were 
allowed to hold each object with both hands 
for a period of five seconds at which point 
the experimenter tapped the table, signaling 
the subject to release the stimulus. In the 
visual acquisition condition, subjects were 
permitted to view the same individual 
stimulus for five seconds. The 18 stimuli 
used in acquisition, six from each category 
(familiar, non-familiar, geometric), were 
randomly ordered and occurred either 2, 4, 
or 6 times. This resulted in a list containing 
72 items: six items occurring 2 times, six 
items occurring 4 times, and six items 
occurring 6 times. 
During testing, six more items (two 
of each category) were added which had not 
occurred during the acquisition portion. 
These are referred to as zero frequency 
items. During the test, subjects in the tactile 
condition were presented with the 24 
stimuli one by one, randomly ordered, 
while still blindfolded. Subjects in the 
visual condition viewed the 24 items in the 
same random order as for tactile subjects. 
Subjects in both conditions were asked to 
report aloud how many times they thought 
each item had occurred during acquisition. 
Subjects' responses were recorded for each 
of the 24 items. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A significant effect for frequency 
resulted, F(3, 114) = 72.92, p= .000. The 
average estimate for items occumng 0 
times, 2 times, 4 times, and 6 times were 
.17, 2.66, 4.51, and 5.83 respectively. On 
the average, subjects were very good at 
estimating frequency; as the frequency of 
occurrence of each item increased, so did 
the subjects' estimates. Subjects were able 
to differentiate between those items which 
occurred only a few times from those items 
which occurred more often. 
A significant effect for stimulus type 
also appeared, F(2, 76) = 4.54, a = .014. 
The average estimate for familiar items was 
reported to be 3.36 times, 3.07 times for  
nonsense items, and 3.30 times for 
geometric items. 
It is interesting to note that the 
average estimate for nonsense items is 
closest to the actual occurrence. Although 
the exact reasons for this observation are 
not known, the following explanations are 
offered. First of all, it is helpful to utilize 
Hintzman's theory (1976, cited in Hasher 
& Zacks, 1984) that our memory system 
works in such a way that a separate trace is 
established for each occurrence of an event 
(i.e., item). With this in mind, it is possible 
that traces established in this experiment 
were confused with traces previously 
established due to prior exposure to those 
items. In other words, the familiar and 
geometric items have, presumably, been 
encountered before in everyday life. Traces 
made by those encounters may be confused 
with traces established during the 
experiment. The nonsense items 
presumably have not been zncountered 
nearly as often, if at all, prior to this 
experiment and therefore the trace record 
for these items is not as extensive. As a 
result, subjects are less likely to confuse 
these traces and estimates of the frequency 
of occurrence of nonsense items turns out 
to be closer to the actual occurrence. 
A second explanation deals with the 
observation that many subjects tended to 
explore the nonsense items more 
extensively than they did any of the other 
items. Subjects appeared to lose interest in 
the familiar and geometric stimuli upon 
repeated presentations but were consistently 
attentive when presented with the nonsense 
items. Taking into consideration the direct 
coding mechanism involved in the 
processing of frequency information 
(Jonides et al., 1987), it is possible that the 
unfamiliarity of such items caused subjects 
to pay more attention during the 
presentation, thus resulting in recall that 
was closer to the actual occurrence. 
Furthermore, because subjects tended to 
lose interest when presented with the other 
item types, estimates were not as close to 
the actual occurrence. 
A significant interaction between 
frequency and stimulus type was also 
observed, F(6, 228) = 264.68, p. = .000. 
The average frequency estimates obtained 
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Figure 1. Average estimates of the frequency of occurence of familiar, 
nonsense, and geometric items versus the actual occurence of each 
item in Experiment 1. 
in figure 1. While the general trend of the 
curves representing the familiar and 
nonsense items appears to be similar, the 
different trend of the curve representing the 
geometric items becomes evident. We are 
not sure why this difference exists. It is 
interesting to note, however, that the 
average incremental increase in estimates 
between each frequency interval (i.e., 0, 2, 
4, and 6) for familiar items was 2.15, .15 
above the actual increase of 2, and 1.85 for 
nonsense items, .15 below the actual 
increase. It is possible that subjects reported 
lower estimates of the nonsense items 
because the item identities were not clear 
cut. Instead, the traces created for these 
items may have been clustered together, 
resulting in estimates which, on the 
average, increased slightly less than the 
actual increase in frequency. Average 
estimates of the frequency of occurrence of 
the familiar items may have been larger 
because subjects confused previously 
established traces with those established in 
the experiment, as was discussed earlier. In 
either case, as the frequency of occurrence 
of each item increases from zero to six 
presentations, the average estimate 
increases as well, never straying more than 
.15 from the actual value. 
No significant difference was 
observed between the performance of the 
visual group, M = 3.383, versus the tactual  
group, M = 3.205, F< 1. An interaction 
between groups and frequency was not 
observed, E < 1, nor was there an 
interaction between group type and stimulus 
type, F < 1. In general, if the performance 
on the frequency task in one modality is 
known, performance on the same task in 
the other modality will be about the same, 
regardless of the frequency interval or 
stimulus type. The three-way interaction 
between group, frequency, and stimulus 
type was also not significant F(6, 228) 
=1.68, 1=.127. 
As expected, our results 
demonstrated people's ability to maintain an 
accurate account of the frequency of 
occurrence of events around them. These 
results also support our hypothesis that 
stimulus type (i.e., geometric, nonsense, or 
familiar items) affects memory for 
frequency recall; however, the results also 
demonstrate an effect we had not expected: 
average estimates (across modalities and 
frequency intervals) were closest to actual 
occurrence for nonsense items, not for 
familiar items, as we had hypothesized. 
However, when the significant interaction 
between stimulus type and frequency is 
taken into consideration, it becomes clear 
that the average estimates increased close to 
the actual increase for both familiar and 
nonsense items. Lastly, although we had 
suggested that differences in performance in 
memory for frequency might emerge for 
different modalities, our results did not 
support this conclusion. This may indicate 
that a single mechanism is involved in the 
processing of frequency information. 
Experiment 2 assesses this hypothesis. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Fifty undergraduate students 
participated in the study, some of whom 
received extra credit. None of the 
participants were paid. All were treated in 
accordance with the "Ethical Principles of 
Psychologists" (American Psychological 
Association, 1981). 
Materials 
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The stimuli were the same as those 
presented in Experiment 1. The randomized 
lists used in acquisition and testing were 
also identical to those used in the first 
experiment. 
Procedure 
Subjects heard the same instructions 
used in Experiment 1. Again, the nature of 
the memory test was left unspecified. 
During the acquisition phase, 
subjects in the visual-tactile condition (VT) 
were shown individually each of the 72 
stimuli, randomly ordered as in Experiment 
1. Subjects in the tactile-visual condition 
(TV) were blindfolded and permitted to 
handle the same 72 stimuli, randomly 
ordered. Both groups were allowed five 
seconds to study each object. 
Modality was switched during the 
testing phase. That is, those subjects in the 
VT condition were asked to blindfold 
themselves for the testing phase and those 
in the TV condition were permitted to 
remove their blindfolds. The 24 items, 
randomly ordered, were presented to each 
subject. TV subjects were only allowed to 
view the objects during testing while VT 
subjects were permitted to feel the objects. 
U;con presentation, subjects in both groups 
were asked to report aloud how many times 
they had encountered the item prior to the 
current presentation. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A significant effect for frequency 
resulted, F(3, 144) = 62.14, a=.000. 
Average estimates for items occurring 0 
times, 2 times, 4 times, and 6 times were 
.42, 2.99, 4.59, 5.63 respectively. Again, 
as the actual frequency of items increased, 
subjects' estimates of the frequency of these 
items also increased. An 
	 interaction 
between frequency and stimulus type also 
occurred, E(6. 288) . 2.32, 12.= .03. The 
average frequency estimates obtained for 
the three stimulus types are represented in 
Figure 2. As in Experiment 1, a similar 
trend may be observed between the 
frequency estimates of familiar items and 
nonsense items. The average incremental 
increase in estimates between each  
frequency interval (i.e., 0, 2, 4, and 6) for 
familiar items was 2.01 and 1.88 for 
nonsense items. 
Geometric items, on the other hand, 
once again followed a different frequency 
trend. Aside from recognizing that some 
geometric shapes were novel in testing, 
subjects were largely unable to differentiate 
the frequency of occurrence of items 
appearing two, four, or six times. Klatzky 
et al. (1985) reported that subjects used 
particular cues when identifying items 
haptically. The cues used most often 
include global shape, global textures, and 
the presence of a distinct component while 
component texture, global size, and 
component shape were utilized less often. 
When modalities were different in 
acquisition and testing, these haptic cues 
were not available for subjects to use to 
make distinctions between the geometric 
items. For example, subjects in the visual-
tactile group may have used color as a cue 
to recognize the different geometric stimuli. 
When modality was switched in testing, 
this cue was not available. Instead, the 
haptic system had only the number of sides 
of the objects to differentiate between the 
stimuli. 
2 	 4 	 6 
ACTUAL FREQUENCY 
Figure 2. Average estimates of the frequency of occtuence off familiar, 
nonsense, and geometric items versus the actual occurence of each 
item in Experiment 2. 
The average frequency estimate for 
the tactile-visual (TV) condition was 3.27 
and 3.54 for the visual-tactile (VT) 
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condition, F <1 . Performance was 
comparable in both conditions. 
The fact that no significant 
difference resulted between the conditions 
suggests that frequency information is 
processed similarly in both the visual and 
haptic modalities. The lack of difference 
supports the hypothesis that there is a 
central frequency processing mechanism, 
responsible for keeping track of the number 
of times events occur around us, regardless 
of modality. 
Average estimates for familiar, 
nonsense, and geometric items were 3.30, 
3.18, and 3.75 respectively, and did not 
differ significantly, F(2, 96) = 1.51, 
a=.226. An interaction between condition 
and stimulus type was not evident, F< 1, 
nor was there an interaction between 
condition and frequency, F< 1, or between 
condition, frequency, and stimulus type, 
F(6, 288) =1.41, p..= .209. Again, if 
subjects' performance in one condition is 
known, performance on the same task in 
the other condition will be about the same, 
regardless of stimulus type and frequency 
interval. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This research demonstrates that the 
ability people have to remember the number 
of times events occur around them extends 
into the haptic modality. Furthermore, the 
sensitivity to frequency did not differ 
between the visual and tactile modalities. 
Both experiments support the 
possibility that there is a central processing 
mechanism responsible for keeping track of 
frequency information. It appears that 
frequency information is not registered 
separately, but is rather processed by a 
single mechanism, regardless of modality. 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that differences 
in ability to estimate frequency do not exist 
between the modalities. In Experiment 2, 
results indicated that frequency information 
experienced and processed by one modality 
could be retrieved by cues given to another 
modality, providing the strongest support 
for our central processing hypotheses. 
Another aspect of the studies 
included the stimulus type used in the tasks. 
Originally, it was hypothesized that the  
familiarity of the stimuli might affect the 
frequency estimates. In Experiment 1, 
results indicated a significant effect for 
stimulus type. The average estimates for 
non-familiar items were closest to the actual 
frequency of occurrence, M = 3.07 times, 
while estimates for familiar items tended to 
be higher than the actual occurrence, M 
=3.36. In Experiment 2, however, a 
significant effect of stimulus type did not 
appear. Average estimates were 3.30, 3.18, 
and 3.75 for familiar, nonsense, and 
geometric items respectively. The error 
variability was larger in the second 
experiment, indicating the difference in 
averages may not be only due to the 
stimulus type itself, but may also be due to 
unknown factors. 
In examining the results of the 
geometric items, it becomes evident that 
perhaps it is not helpful to look at the 
stimuli on a continuum of familiarity. 
Rather it may be more useful to look at the 
stimuli in terms of how many cues are 
available for the modalities to process. The 
familiar items were rich in haptic cues (e.g., 
presence of a distinct component such as 
the pen cap or tea bag string) and visual 
cues (e.g., color). The same holds true for 
the non-familiar items (e.g., haptic cues 
include the wire component of the incense 
burner and visual cues include color). For 
the geometric items, the haptic system had 
to rely on the cue of the number of sides of 
an object to differentiate between one 
geometric item and the next. The visual 
system, on the other hand, could use this 
cue as well as the .color of the items. In 
Experiment 1, these cues could be relied 
upon to distinguish between the stimuli in 
both acquisition and testing. However, in 
Experiment 2, color cannot be detected by 
the haptic system and only the number of 
sides remains as a cue between the 
modalities. In both cases, however, only a 
small number of cues exist, thus subjects 
had difficulty distinguishing among 
geometric items. 
In conclusion, memory for 
frequency information may very well be 
processed in one, central location. In 
addition, whereas the ability to remember 
the number of times events occur around us 
in not affected by presentation modality, the 
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number of stimulus cues available does 
affect the ability to process frequency 
information. 
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